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CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRADE
ARBITRATION COMMISSION IN 2006:
NEW RULES, SAME RESULTS?
Benjamin O. Kostrzewa†
Abstract: In May of 2005, the China International Economic Trade Arbitration
Commission (“CIETAC”) was updated with new rules designed to bring it into
conformity with international arbitration standards. The rules were the most recent
efforts by the Chinese government to provide foreign companies with an alternative to
the Chinese judiciary, which is often considered parochial, unsophisticated, and unable to
handle modern business conflicts. The new rules cure many of the problems associated
with arbitration in China and have created a predominantly fair and professional dispute
resolution forum. Currently, CIETAC suffers more from award collection problems
rather than problems in its rules and procedures. Arbitration in China must still rely on
the judiciary for the enforcement of awards. The Chinese government has reformed
many aspects of the judiciary to make the enforcement of arbitration awards more
uniform and just; yet it remains difficult to seize assets in order to satisfy an arbitral
award. This Comment analyzes the 2005 changes to the CIETAC rules, and examines
the Chinese government’s efforts to reform the enforcement of arbitration judgments.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past twenty-five years, the blistering speed of Chinese
economic development outpaced efforts to reform China’s judicial system.
The corresponding expansion in legal relationships between foreign and
Chinese businesses created a demand for forums to hear legal claims.
Recently, professional arbitration organizations have filled that void as an
alternative to the Chinese judiciary.1 Foreign corporations, leery of a
Chinese legal system that is widely considered to be parochial,
unsophisticated, and unable to handle modern business conflicts, often
choose private arbitration institutions to resolve disputes.2
The China International Economic Trade Arbitration Commission
(“CIETAC”) is the leading arbitration organization for foreign-related legal
disputes. CIETAC was established in 1988 out of its predecessor, the
Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“FETAC”).3
CIETAC is now the world’s busiest international business arbitration
†
Juris Doctor expected 2007. The author would like to thank his advisor, Dr. Zang Dongsheng, as
well as Keith Hand for their direction and guidance. He would also like to thank the Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal editorial staff for their constant commitment to excellence.
1
JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA xiv (2004) [hereinafter TAO].
2
Id.
3
ARBITRATION IN CHINA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 7 (Jerome A. Cohen et al., eds., 2004) [hereinafter
Cohen et al.].
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institution, handling over 850 cases in 2004.4 Yet, in spite of the growing
volume of cases CIETAC handles, some international observers believe that
it still has institutional problems that chip away at its objectivity and
effectiveness.5
In 2005, CIETAC issued new arbitration rules to address many of the
problems commonly associated with it.6 Problems with the arbitrator
selection process and the efficiency of the tribunal were improved to meet
international norms of arbitration.7 These new regulations are an important
step for CIETAC towards fully meeting international arbitration standards,
for they solve many of the systemic defects that plagued the CIETAC
arbitration process.
The Chinese government is aware of the importance of arbitration and
regularly reforms its laws and regulations in order to modernize the legal
system. In addition to the CIETAC rules, there have been many changes
made to the judiciary to make the enforcement of arbitration awards as fair
as possible.8 The effectiveness of such reforms, however, is often
questioned.9 Post-award problems in the execution of awards continue to
plague the Chinese system in spite of reform efforts by the Chinese
government.10
However, other problems regularly associated with arbitration in
China, such as local protectionism, bias against foreigners, and competency
of the courts, are more a problem of outside perception of CIETAC rather
than actual institutional defects.11 The widespread reform efforts to ensure

4
Darren Fitzgerald, CIETAC’s New Arbitration Rules: Do the Reforms Go Far Enough?, ASIAN
DISP. REV., July 2005, at 51.
5
See generally Jerome A. Cohen, Time to Fix China’s Arbitration, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 2005, at
31.
6
China Int’l Econ. & Trade Arb. Commission Arb. Rules (Revised and Adopted by the China
Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade China Chamber of Int’l Com. on Jan. 11, 2005, effective May 1,
2005) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.cietac.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2006) [hereinafter CIETAC Arb.
Rules].
7
Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51.
8
The Chinese government regularly updates and revises its laws. See generally Jean-Pierre
Cabestan, The Pol. and Prac. Obstacles to the Reform of the Judiciary and the Establishment of a Rule of
Law in China, 10 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 1 (2005) (describing the efforts and difficulties of reforming
Chinese law).
9
See TAO, supra note 1, at xv.
10
See generally HU LI, ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARD :
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD IN THE P.R. CHINA 148 (2000).
11
Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 253-255 (2001).
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the legitimacy of arbitration in China are under appreciated by the business
community at large.12
In order to solve both the problems that still remain in the seizure of
assets to satisfy arbitral awards, as well as the institutional defects that
remain in CIETAC, the Chinese government must reduce the gap between
the statutory authority granted by the law and the lack of legal power the
courts currently hold in China. Comprehensive redrafting of statutes is an
important step; however, the Chinese government must also encourage the
judiciary to become strong and independent.
This Comment will examine the development of Chinese arbitration
law. Part II will discuss international arbitration generally and the
development of Chinese arbitration. Part III will analyze the 2005 CIETAC
revisions and the problems that were cured by the changes. Part IV will
examine the post-award legal regime in China and the problems that remain.
Lastly, this Comment will identify remedies to the real and perceived
problems that remain after the 2005 arbitration rules in China.
II.

CIETAC HAS DEVELOPED TO MEET INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
STANDARDS

International arbitration seeks to provide an alternative to traditional
litigation by allowing the parties to craft a forum that best suits their
individual needs.13 Rather than the formalism of rules and procedure that
colors litigation, arbitration offers flexibility, efficiency, and privacy for the
parties involved.14
A.

International Arbitration Tribunals Share Common Norms

Though there are dozens of arbitration tribunals and courts around the
world, they all share similar goals.15 The London Court of International
Arbitration (“LCIA”), for example, advertises the benefits of arbitration as:
Maximum flexibility for parties and tribunals to agree on
procedural matters, speed and efficiency in the appointment of
arbitrators, including expedited procedures, means of reducing
12
Wang Shengchang, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the People’s Republic of China, in
IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION 461, 498-99 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1999).
13
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 7 (2d
ed. 2001).
14
Id.
15
Id.
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delays and counteracting delaying tactics, tribunals’ power to
order security for claims and for costs, special powers for
joinder of third parties, fast-track option, waiver of first right of
appeal, costs computed without regard to the amounts in
dispute, [and] staged deposits.16
When China signed the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”),17 arbitration became the
chosen method for international dispute resolution.18 The New York
Convention internationalized the enforcement of arbitration awards, and this,
in combination with the rising costs of litigation, made it a more amenable
forum for international dispute resolution.19 The convention was particularly
important in China, given the many problems of the judiciary.20 As
arbitration institutions in China and around the world became better able to
hear disputes, the number of cases also increased markedly.21 However, the
phenomenon of arbitration in China is relatively recent.22 Prior to the postMao economic reforms, little arbitration took place in China.23
B.

Arbitration in China Matured Only After 1978

Some scholars believe that Chinese culture is more amenable to
alternative dispute resolution than litigation, citing Confucian values and an
historical emphasis on mediation.24 The beginnings of modern Chinese
arbitration can be traced to 1912, immediately after the end of the Qing
16

London Court of International Arbitration, http://www.lcia.org/ARB_folder/arb_main.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006).
17
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 3, June 10. 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517
[hereinafter New York Convention]; see Notice of the NSC Concerning the Enforcement of the Convention
on the Recognition And Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Issued by the NSC on April 10, 1987.
18
David P. Stewart, National Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under Treaties and Conventions, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 163, 164 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower
eds., 1992).
19
Id.
20
Both Chinese and Western scholars have identified many problems with the judiciary, including
the competence of judges, the independence of the judiciary, and corruption. See generally STANLEY
LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999); Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming
China’s Civil Procedure: Judging the Courts, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 793, 795 (1997).
21
CIETAC cases increased from 267 cases in 1992 to 850 cases in 2004. Other arbitration
commissions also saw gains; however, they did not increase at the same pace as CIETAC. For complete
statistical information, see Hong Kong International Arbitration Center, International Arbitration Cases
Received, http://hkiac.org/HKIAC/HKIAC_English/main.html (follow “Statistics” link) (last visited Feb.
15, 2006).
22
JOHN SHIJIAN MO, ARBITRATION LAW IN CHINA 21 (2001).
23
Id.
24
Ellen S. Reinstein, Finding a Happy Ending for Foreign Investors: The Enforcement of
Arbitration Awards in the People’s Republic of China 6 (2005).
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dynasty.25 However, most of the modern system developed after 1978.26
Prior to that time, China conducted little foreign trade, and international
arbitration was neither necessary nor important to the economy or politics of
China.27
CIETAC developed from several previous organizations, including the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (“CCPIT”) and the
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (“FTAC”).28 FTAC was established
in 1956 under the auspices of CCPIT in order to facilitate trade between
foreign and Chinese companies.29 However, the State Council, one of the
top organs of the Chinese state, controlled the jurisdiction, structure, and
final decisions of cases adjudicated by FTAC.30 After the reform period
began in 1978, FTAC was renamed the Foreign Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (“FETAC”) and gained scope and strength as
foreign trade flourished in China.31 Under its new mandate, FETAC could
hear disputes involving “business transactions and foreign trade contracts
between foreign and Chinese entities to such disputes between totally
external parties who may choose China as the arbitration forum.”32 This
expansion of jurisdiction meant that FETAC could hear cases that were
wholly outside of China.33 In 1988, upon the promulgation of new
regulations, FETAC officially changed its name to CIETAC in order to
underscore the continued changes to its structure.34
During the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, China withdrew from
the world.35
The Chinese government refused to sign multilateral
agreements, and from 1965 to 1979, no scholarly writings on international
law were published in Mainland China.36 After 1978, however, the Chinese
government quickly signed nearly forty multilateral agreements in less than
25

TAO, supra note 1, at 1.
Mo, supra note 22, at 23.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
TAO, supra note 1, at 17.
30
Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 5-6.
31
State Council’s Notice Concerning the Conversion of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission
into the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (promulgated by the State Council on Feb.
26, 1980, effective Feb. 26, 1980).
32
Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 7.
33
TAO, supra note 1, at 18.
34
See The State Council’s Official Reply Concerning the Renaming of the Foreign Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission as the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and
the Amendment of its Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the State Council June 21, 1988).
35
Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 6.
36
HUNGDAH CHIU, CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST-MAO ERA,
1978-1987, at 3 (1988).
26
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ten years.37 The renewed commitment to arbitration can be traced to the
Chinese leaders’ desire to benefit from international trade.38
Most relevant to the enforcement of arbitration was the ratification of
the New York Convention.39 This Convention provides a basis for CIETAC
decisions to be enforced in other countries as well as arbitration decisions
from foreign jurisdictions to be enforced within China. This was part of
China’s broader effort to modernize the economy and enter into the world
community.
In the 1990s, the jurisdictional scope and international credibility of
arbitration in China grew as state-sponsored arbitration organizations
matured.40 The biggest changes to the law were made in 1994, with the
passing of the Arbitration Law.41 Prior to 1994, arbitration in China was
governed solely by the Civil Procedure Law, foreign investment legislation,
and the New York Convention.42 The new Arbitration Law unified and
institutionalized arbitration as a dispute resolution system for China.43
These laws comprise the legal framework for arbitration in China.44
As can be seen from the rapid development of arbitration laws and
institutions, China’s arbitration system is still relatively new. Though it has
roots in the reforms immediately after the 1949 revolution, most of the
substantial law surrounding arbitration in China was developed after 1978.
The changes in the 2005 CIETAC Arbitration Rules represent a continuation
of the development of arbitration in China.

37

Id. at 29-33.
CHIU, supra note 36, at 3.
39
China’s two reservations to the treaty were common: the first required reciprocity in order for an
arbitration agreement to be enforced; the second limited arbitration to commercial matters. See CHENG
DEJUN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMS AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION PRACTICE 252 (1993).
40
Matthew Miller, Disputes Tribunal Powers Widened, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 9, 1998, at 2.
41
Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China, (passed on Aug. 31, 1994 by the Nat’l
People’s Cong., promulgated on Aug. 31 1994 by the Decree No. 31 of the President of the PRC, effective
Sep. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Arbitration Law].
42
MICHAEL J. MOSER ET AL., HONG KONG AND CHINA ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 305306 (1994).
43
Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 15.
44
Chinese arbitration has typically been divided into domestic arbitrations and foreign arbitrations.
Domestic arbitrations have different organizations, arbitrators, and are governed by different laws. Then,
in 2000, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules were revised to remove jurisdictional distinctions so that domestic
arbitration could benefit from the advances in foreign arbitration. Though there are jurisdictional overlaps
between domestic and foreign arbitration tribunals in China, the original distinctions remain. See Xiaowen
Qiu, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A Comparison of the United States and China,
11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607 (2000).
38
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THE 2005 CIETAC RULES AND AMENDMENTS HELP CREATE A FAIRER
AND MORE EFFECTIVE FORUM

On May 1, 2005, the new arbitration rules went into effect as CIETAC
attempted to reform some of the institutional problems.45 The changes target
the arbitrator selection process in order to ensure that only unbiased,
competent, and objective arbitrators serve on the panel.46 They also
attempted to cure institutional inefficiencies, grant parties greater autonomy,
and speed up the arbitration process.47 The new rules have largely cured the
problems previously associated with CIETAC’s arbitration rules, leaving
mostly post-judgment enforcement problems.48
A.

The Changes to the Arbitrator Selection Process Create a More
Impartial Forum

The selection of arbitrators is one of the most important and
contentious issues facing CIETAC.49 The arbitration tribunal is the face of
CIETAC, as the arbitrators on the panel have control over the outcome of the
decision. Therefore, a selection process that guarantees an objective
arbitration tribunal is critical to the legitimacy of CIETAC.
The 2005 CIETAC rules made substantial changes to how arbitrators
are appointed.50 The rules create a “list system” for either a sole arbitrator or
a presiding arbitrator.51 When deciding between the two competing lists,
“the Chairman of CIETAC shall choose a presiding arbitrator from among
the common candidates based on the specific nature and circumstances of
the case, who shall act as the presiding arbitrator jointly appointed by the
parties.”52 This increases the autonomy of the parties to choose their own
arbitrators, but it requires that there be common names on both lists. If there
is no agreement, the decision will fall back to the CIETAC Chairman.53
The new regulations also allow for non-CIETAC arbitrators to serve
on a tribunal.54 Previously, only CIETAC arbitrators could serve on a
45

CIETAC Arbitration Rules (Adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade and the China Chamber of International Commerce on January 11, 2005, effective May 1, 2005.)
46
Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51.
47
Id.
48
Peerenboom, supra note 11, at 3.
49
Jerome A. Cohen, Time to Fix China’s Arbitration, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 2005, at 31.
50
CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 22(3).
51
In the CIETAC Rules, the two parties can elect to have only one arbitrator. Otherwise, the panel
will have three arbitrators, with one serving as the presiding arbitrator. CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 20.
52
CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 22(3).
53
Id. § 22(4).
54
Id. § 21(2).
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tribunal;55 however, the new rules allow for people who are not on the
CIETAC panel of arbitrators to serve, subject to approval by the Chairman
of CIETAC.56
Disclosure of potential conflicts of interest was a consistent problem
for CIETAC.57 The revisions made in 2000 required arbitrators to disclose if
they had a personal interest in the case, and if need be, request removal.58
However, CIETAC arbitrators often served as personnel within the CIETAC
organization, which led to a blurring of the lines between CIETAC
arbitrators and the CIETAC staff. This created the impression that CIETAC
as an organization is exerting pressure on the arbitrators to decide a case a
certain way.59
Arbitrators are now required to file a declaration of relevant facts that
could give rise to a conflict of interest.60 Article 25(1) states: “An arbitrator
appointed by the parties or by the Chairman of the CIETAC shall sign a
declaration and disclose to the CIETAC in writing any facts or
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his/her
impartiality or independence.”61 This regulation is an improvement from the
previous regulations, which did not have a written declaration requirement.62
In addition, the CIETAC regulations now allow for-cause challenges
to arbitrators within ten business days of the declaration by the arbitrator.63
Although the CIETAC chairman is the ultimate adjudicator of such
challenges, this is another way parties can remove arbitrators.
B.

The Systemic Changes in the New Rules Have Cured Many
Institutional Defects

Some of the most important changes in the new rules are to the
arbitral process.64 As mentioned previously, one of the principal reasons to
arbitrate a dispute is flexibility.65 Parties are able to craft a dispute forum
that best suits their needs. The new CIETAC regulations allow for greater
55

Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51.
Id.
57
Cohen, supra note 49, at 31.
58
CIETAC Arbitration Rules §§ 28-29.
59
Cohen, supra note 49, at 31.
60
Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 52.
61
CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 25(1).
62
Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51.
63
CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 26.
64
See Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51.
65
See Howard M. Holtzmann, Balancing the Need for Certainty and Flexibility in International
Arbitration Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS
“JUDICIALIZATION” AND UNIFORMITY? 3 (Lillich & Brower eds., 1994).
56
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autonomy for both the tribunal and the parties.66 They also make two
substantial systemic changes that address critical problems of transparency
and efficiency: the publication of minority opinions, and the speeding up of
the arbitration process.67
Under the new regulations, individual arbitral tribunals, rather than
CIETAC personnel, have increased powers to shape the nature of the
hearings.68 The new regulations allow for the arbitral tribunal to “examine
the case in any way that it deems appropriate unless otherwise agreed by the
parties,” including whether the hearing will be inquisitorial or adversarial in
nature.69 The tribunal now decides many of the procedural questions, such
as the lists of questions, time and topic of pre-hearing meetings, preliminary
hearings, and the terms of reference.70
While this seems to give a wide range of options to the arbitration
tribunal, it gives even more latitude to the parties involved. Every clause
that gives power to the tribunals is prefaced by “unless otherwise agreed by
the parties,” essentially giving them veto power over any possible changes,
assuming the opposing parties can come to agreement.71 This change should
be welcome to some observers who saw CIETAC’s paternalism over the
hearing structures as an impediment to the autonomy of the parties.72
In fact, parties can avoid the use of the CIETAC rules altogether.
Under Article 4(2), parties that have agreed to other rules, such as the
American Arbitration Association or the London Court of International
Arbitration, may still have their claims heard by CIETAC.73 Additionally,
new rules have been promulgated for specific industry areas, such as for
financial disputes.74
The new regulations also allow for dissenting opinions to be attached
to the file, though they are not actually part of the award.75 Prior to the May
2005 regulations, dissenting opinions were not provided to the parties.76
66

Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51.
CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 43(4).
68
Id. § 29(1).
69
Id. §§ 29(1), (3).
70
See id. §§ 29, 31, 32, 33(1).
71
See, e.g., id. §§ 29, 31, 32, 33(1).
72
See Xiaowen Qiu, Note & Comment, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A
Comparison of The United States and China, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607, 613 (2000).
73
The only exception is when “such agreement is inoperative or in conflict with a mandatory
provision of the law of the place of the arbitration.” CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 4(2).
74
CIETAC Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules (revised and adopted by the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce on Mar. 17, 2005, effective
May 1, 2005), available at http://cietac.org.cn/english/rules/rules_2.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
75
CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 43(4).
76
Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 52.
67
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Critics claimed that this practice reduced the transparency of the proceedings
and limited opportunities to appeal the judgment, as it gave the appearance
of unanimity.77 In the new regulations, however, Article 43(4) states that
“[a] written dissenting opinion shall be docketed into the file and may be
attached to the award, but it shall not form part of the award.”78 This
provision is a major step toward allowing dissenting opinions, but some
observers question the language of the provision.79 The term “may” seems
to allow CIETAC the ability to continue to stifle dissenting opinions as it
chooses.80 It is unclear how the article will be interpreted.81
One of the principal changes is to allow faster adjudication of cases by
reducing the time in which a decision will be made and reducing the
possibility for a rehearing of the case. As the quantity of cases CIETAC
hears has grown, the arbitral fees have increased.82 Because avoiding the
expense and the delays of the court systems is one of the major advantages
of arbitration, CIETAC addressed the problem by increasing the power of
the arbitral tribunal over procedural management, making faster decisions,
and allowing for more truncated tribunals.83
CIETAC is attempting to reduce institutional delay by reducing the
time the panel has to render a decision, as well as other measures.84 After
criticism over the slow rendering of decisions, under the new regulations the
arbitration tribunal now has six months to render a decision, rather than the
nine months previously allotted.85 The time period can be extended only
with the express consent of the CIETAC Chairman.86
The new regulations provide for the replacement of an arbitrator or
continuation of the process without one of the original arbitrators.87 Article
27 provides procedures for the event that an arbitrator is unable to continue
his or her duties any time prior to the end of the hearings.88 If the arbitrator
cannot continue because of withdrawal, resignation, health, or any other
issue, “a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed within a time period
77

Cohen, supra note 49, at 32.
CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 43(1).
79
See Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 52.
80
CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 42.
81
Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51.
82
Even a relatively small claim can cost over five thousand U.S. dollars in CIETAC fees alone. See
Arbitration Fee Schedule, http://cietac.org.cn/english/fee/fee.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
83
See CIETAC Arbitration Rules §§ 27, 28, 42(1).
84
See id. § 42.
85
Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 52.
86
CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 42(1).
87
Id. § 27.
88
Id.
78
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specified by the CIETAC pursuant to the procedure applied to the
appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.”89 Though the CIETAC
Chairman has the final decision whether or not an arbitrator should be
replaced, the arbitration tribunal “shall decide whether the whole or a part of
the previous proceedings of the cases shall be repeated.”90 This should
allow for fewer arbitration interruptions due to an arbitrator being unable to
fulfill his responsibilities.
C.

The New Rules Leave Unresolved Problems

The new arbitration rules leave several problems unaddressed. One of
the most controversial of these problems is the nationality of the presiding
arbitrator.91 After a dispute has been properly filed at CIETAC, each party
may choose one of the arbitrators on the three-person panel.92 The third
arbitrator, who presides, is jointly agreed upon by the parties, or assigned by
CIETAC in the event that the parties cannot come to agreement.93 While
facially this seems to be a fair result, the practical outcome is that the third
arbitrator is often a Chinese national.94 Also, almost a quarter of the
arbitrators are from a country other than China.95 Because the Chinese
corporation is likely to choose a Chinese national and the presiding arbitrator
is also likely to be a Chinese national, foreign parties may believe that the
tribunal is biased against the foreign party.96
This bias, however, may relate more to foreign perceptions of Chinese
legal attitudes than demonstrable bias in Chinese arbitrators. The Chinese
members of the CIETAC panel are all experts in their field, having
graduated from China’s top law schools.97 Many have also studied law
abroad.98 Their professional credibility is at stake every time they hear a
case.
Furthermore, foreign arbitrators are equally likely to have
relationships with Chinese government institutions, state owned enterprises,

89

Id. § 27(2).
Id. § 27(3).
91
Cohen, supra note 49, at 31.
92
CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 22(1).
93
Id. § 22(2)–(4).
94
See Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 53.
95
Michael Moser, CIETAC Arbitration: A Success Story?, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 27 (1998).
96
Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 53.
97
See Lingyun Gao, What Makes a Lawyer in China? The Chinese Legal Education System After
China’s Entry into the WTO, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 197 (2002).
98
CIETAC Arbitrator Panel List, http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/arbitrators/arbitrators_2.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006).
90
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and private Chinese companies.99 Therefore, attempting to paint Chinese
arbitrators as being biased against foreign companies based solely on
nationality seems unfounded. Furthermore, even absent an explicit
provision in the CIETAC rules requiring a foreign arbitrator, an attorney
drafting the arbitration clause may require that the presiding arbitrator be a
national of a third country.100 Such clauses have been consistently upheld by
CIETAC.101
Finally, while some have called for a specific CIETAC regulation
requiring the presiding arbitrator to be a national of a third country, such a
regulation might run counter to international arbitration standards. The
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”)
model arbitration statute states, “[n]o person shall be precluded by reason of
his nationality from acting as an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed to by the
parties.”102 While the UNCITRAL model statute is not binding law on
CIETAC, it could be considered a normative argument against such a
provision.
D.

Limited Empirical Evidence Casts CIETAC in a Positive Light

Empirical evidence regarding the objectivity of CIETAC is limited.
Given the vast scale of China and the limited access to reliable information,
comprehensive data collection on arbitration award collection rates is all but
impossible.103 The few studies done on CIETAC competency were
overwhelmingly positive, even prior to the 2005 amendment.104 The
American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing conducted a survey of
American companies.105 They found that the respondents who had actual
experience with CIETAC and arbitration in China found it to be fair and

99
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efficient.106 Oddly, those without arbitration experience in China tended to
have negative views of arbitration in China.107 Furthermore, the foreign
party won more than half of all CIETAC decisions. While this statistic is not
dispositive, it does indicate that concerns of local protectionism are largely
unsubstantiated.108
IV.

THE CHINESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM’S LAWS FOR ENFORCING ARBITRATION
AWARDS ARE FAIR AND OBJECTIVE

The CIETAC hearings are only part of the process. As is true for all
arbitration centers, they are unable to enforce arbitration awards without the
assistance of the courts.109 In China, however, the problems of enforcement
are exacerbated by other problems in the judiciary.
Like most countries in the world, China relies on its courts to enforce
arbitration awards.110 Until recently, after the arbitration tribunal rendered
an award, the winning party would take the award to a court in the
jurisdiction where the losing party was domiciled.111 However, under the
Supreme People’s Court’s Notice on Accession, it is now possible to file in
the jurisdiction where the assets are located.112 In Chinese law, as well as
under the New York Convention, a court has a legal obligation to enforce the
award unless it falls within a few enumerated exceptions.113 This makes
arbitration awards far easier to enforce in a foreign country than judicial
decisions. For judicial decisions from other countries, only principles of
comity,114 rather than legal obligation, dictate the enforcement of such
judgments in domestic courts.115
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A foreign company receiving an arbitration award from CIETAC must
turn to the Chinese courts in order to get the award enforced.116 The Chinese
courts are widely considered to be unfair forums for disputes,117 but the
Chinese government has instituted several critical reforms related to
arbitration that make the process distinct from the rest of the judicial system.
A.

The PRC Improved the Procedure for Enforcement of Foreign Awards

In May of 2002 the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) issued a
directive entitled “Some Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction of Civil and
Commercial Cases Involving Foreign Elements”118 in which it declared that
the jurisdiction over arbitration awards is to be limited to a small number of
Intermediate People’s Courts (“IPCs”)119 near the capital cities of provinces
and special economic zones.120 This centralization reflects the greater
sophistication in the cities concerning international business and the
presence of better-trained, English speaking judges.121 Additionally, in these
specialized courts there are special sections that deal only with arbitration
awards.122 This increased sophistication and specialization greatly assists
the arbitration process because judges are now better able to weigh the
merits of enforcement and are more familiar with the international business
environment.123
B.

There Are Limited Grounds for Refusal of Enforcement in China

After an arbitration award has been set out and an application for
enforcement has been filed, the courts may still set aside an award on a
number of enumerated grounds.124 Article 260 of the Civil Procedure Law
116
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(“CPL”) provides for four exceptions to enforcement.125 These provisions
are largely similar to the New York Convention grounds for nonenforcement.126 While there are some criticisms, such as the lack of
discretion by the court if they find one of these grounds for refusal, this
criticism stems more from the differences in common law and civil law
jurisdictions rather than a substantive disagreement about the law.127 The
grounds for refusal of enforcement are supplemented by the 1994 Arbitration
Law, which allows for termination of enforcement in several other
situations.128
In addition to the exceptions enumerated by statute, there is a Chinese
version of the concept of “void against public policy.”129 The Chinese
version is that a particular act would be contrary to the social and public
interests of China.130 Though not explicitly defined in Chinese foreign
arbitration law, the void against public policy language is included in the
grounds to refuse domestic arbitration agreements and in Article V of the
New York Convention.131 It has rarely been cited as actual grounds for
refusal to enforce a foreign-related arbitration award; but at least one case
has raised such concerns. In Dongfeng Garments Factory v. Henan

(3) the said person was unable to state his opinions due to reasons which he is not responsible the
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Garments,132 the IPC found that in spite of the fact that CIETAC rendered an
award for the claimant, the enforcement would be against the state and
public interests of society. The justification was that the defendant was a
significant economic factor in the local economic area; therefore, if the
defendant paid damages it would harm the local economy.133 Fortunately,
the SPC ultimately overruled this decision by the IPC; otherwise, the IPC
decision would have confirmed some of the worst fears about the Chinese
judicial system. As it stands, the IPC decision raises concerns that without a
specific statutory definition, the void against public policy argument could
become a source of government interference in arbitration enforcement.134
In 1995, the Chinese judicial system further cemented its commitment
to enforce foreign-related arbitration awards by requiring that all refusals to
enforce an award be approved by the SPC.135 If the IPC finds grounds for
refusal to enforce under the Civil Procedure Law, it is required to submit the
case to the relevant Higher People’s Court (“HPC”).136 From there, the HPC
can either remand it back to IPC for enforcement, or submit it to the
Supreme People’s Court for final approval of the refusal for enforcement.137
This three-tiered review of arbitration awards makes it extraordinarily
difficult for an arbitration award to be refused.138 Some observers have
stated that more than eighty percent of the cases submitted to the SPC for
refusal of enforcement are ultimately rejected.139 This means that only
twenty percent of cases submitted to the SPC are actually refused
enforcement.140 This centralized system greatly reduces the possibility of
local protectionism, as it reduces the opportunity for local officials or judges
to interfere with the enforcement of arbitration awards.
These changes to Chinese law have created an environment that,
contrary to common perception, makes it relatively easy to go to a court and
enforce an award. The Chinese government has effectively amended the
132

This case was unreported, but has been cited in numerous secondary sources. See CHENG DEJUN,

ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1995).
133

Xiaowen Qiu, supra note 72, at 612.
Gu Weixia, RECOURSE AGAINST ARBITRAL AWARDS: HOW FAR CAN A COURT GO? SUPPORTIVE
AND SUPERVISORY ROLE OF HONG KONG COURTS AS LESSONS TO MAINLAND CHINA ARBITRATION (1999).
135
Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan chuli yu chuwai zhongcai ji waiguo zhongcai shibei
youguan wenti de tongzhi [Supreme People’s Court Notice on the Problems of Handling of Foreign
Arbitration Cases by the People’s Courts] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court Aug. 28, 1995)
(P.R.C.).
136
Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 333-34.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Wang Shengchang, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the PRC, in INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, CONGRESS SERIES NO. 9 (van den Berg ed., 1999).
134

JUNE 2006

CIETAC: NEW RULES, SAME RESULTS?

535

laws to make it amenable for CIETAC awards to be enforced by local courts,
overcoming such previous obstacles as local protectionism. However, there
are still many difficulties in seizing assets to satisfy an arbitration award.
V.

THE EXECUTION OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN CHINA REMAINS A
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM

The statutory regime only tells part of the story of award enforcement
in China. The practical problems of execution of arbitration awards
overshadow the problems that arbitration faces generally in China.141 Under
the CPL and the Enforcement Regulation, courts and enforcement officers
have the legal authority to enforce awards.142 However, the courts suffer
from macro-level problems of separation of political powers that limit their
actual power to seize assets and enforce awards.143
A.

The Courts Have the Requisite Judicial Authority but Not the Legal
Power to Successfully Enforce Awards

Enforcement officers suffer from a gap between the authority the law
purportedly gives them and the lack of power that still haunts the courts
today and continues to pervade Chinese society.144 Chapter 20 of the CPL
gives relatively broad powers to enforcement officers,145 including the power
to garnish wages,146 freeze or auction property,147 evict,148 and other powers
to seize assets.149 Aside from the physical search and seizure of assets, the
courts wield a broad array of other powers, including the ability to freeze
and transfer monies in the banking system.150
The problem is not in the drafting of the law. Under the law,
enforcement officers have broad powers of seizure as well as mechanisms to
punish those who do not comply.151 However, it is rare for the courts,
through its officers, to actually use such mechanisms.152 This is often
blamed on the overall low stature of the Chinese judiciary, though the
141
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judiciary has claimed that to use such powers “will prevent the company
from operating, which could in turn result in greater unemployment and
social unrest.”153
B.

The Courts Lack the Independence and Strength to Effectively Execute
Arbitration Awards

The courts in China suffer from their diminished authority under the
Leninist system of governance.154 The Chinese judiciary is formally
independent, but in reality is treated like any other state organ.155 Because
they treat the judiciary like a bureaucracy, other government organizations
feel they can ignore judicial orders with impunity.156 Banks have been
known to notify parties that their accounts were about to be seized157 and
then transfer the accounts before the courts had a chance to act.158 Banks are
often reticent to cooperate with the government out of “fear of damaging
relationships with their customers.”159 Other critics of the system cite
corruption within the judicial system. One Chinese lawyer stated that she
was aware of situations in which court clerks would receive the award and
then tell the winning party that the losing party did not have the assets to
pay.160 Though rumors and gossip about such nightmare scenarios are
widely circulated, they can rarely be corroborated by objective studies.161
Illegal interference by Communist Party officials is another problem
many observers fear reduces the power of the courts.162 However, at least
one survey (perhaps surprisingly) found that Party members and officials
153
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were only rarely involved.163 In fact, they have been known to promote
arbitral enforcement when involved.164 This is welcome news as it
demonstrates that in spite of the problems of the judicial system, Chinese
officials recognize the importance of arbitration in China.
C.

Empirical Evidence Demonstrates the Difficulties of Asset Seizure

Award enforcement statistics show the difficulties of seizing assets.
Approximately half of all foreign and CIETAC awards were enforced, at
least to some degree.165 However, in only thirty-four percent of the cases
could more than half of the award be recovered; and in more than forty
percent of the cases, less than half of the award was recovered.166
Attempts at surveying the judiciary directly about arbitration
enforcement have encountered great difficulty. In 1997, CIETAC attempted
to survey the IPCs about enforcement of arbitration awards in China.167
Only 43 out of 310 courts completed the survey.168 The Chinese state secret
laws, which are broadly construed, may have made judges reticent to fill out
the survey.169 Furthermore, professional jealousy and a history of rivalry
with CIETAC gave the courts little incentive to cooperate.170
The problem of asset seizure in China will not be solved overnight, as
it requires systemic changes in many aspects of the Chinese business
environment. Changes to the law, financial institutions, and business
organizations must all be realized before asset seizure becomes more
reliable. Unfortunately, the failure of the Chinese arbitration regime to
guarantee the ability of winning parties to claim their award diminishes all
of the statutory changes to CIETAC and Chinese law.
VI.

ARBITRATION IN CHINA NEEDS ADDITIONAL REFORM

Facially, the laws that govern arbitration in China are fair. However,
few parties to arbitration would be satisfied with well-written laws
unsatisfactorily enforced. China must seek to not only promulgate new
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laws, but also ensure that parties receive the compensation that a CIETAC
arbitration award entitles them to.
A.

CIETAC Operations Must Continue to Update and Revise the
Arbitration Rules

CIETAC has emerged as the leading dispute resolution forum in
China, and one of the most sought after forums in the world.171 The new
CIETAC regulations continue the trend of increased professionalism and
credibility within the organization. The greater flexibility in the hearing
structure, arbitrator selection process, publication of dissenting opinions, and
the other transparency and accountability issues addressed by the new
regulations should be commended. However, CIETAC must continue to
revise its rules and ensure that they are strictly enforced. Because arbitration
is a business, customers must be satisfied with the objectivity of the tribunal.
Therefore, the most effective way for CIETAC to address these concerns is
to be as transparent as possible, leaving no room for doubt in its integrity.
As cases are decided under the new rules, CIETAC, in conjunction with
international observers, should evaluate the successes and failures of the new
rules. Any violations of the regulations or international arbitration norms
should quickly be made public and the violators should be dismissed.172
The 2005 amendments to the rules address many, though not all, of
the defects identified by international scholars.173 There are reports that
expert witnesses, rather than being called into the hearing, were informally
contacted outside of the hearing process.174 Perhaps more disconcertingly,
CIETAC administrators, rather than the tribunal, are known to draft the
arbitrator opinions and order decisions on certain cases.175 These allegations
are serious, and CIETAC’s reputation suffers greatly as a result of such
reports. As cases are decided under the new rules, CIETAC personnel, in
conjunction with international observers, should evaluate their successes and
failures.
171
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Finally, the contentious issue of the nationality of the presiding or sole
arbitrator must still be considered. If clients continue to feel as though the
tribunals are not objective as the result of the nationality of the arbitrators,
those feelings will continue to erode the reputation of CIETAC. Therefore,
if the new rules do not clear up perceptions of bias, an amendment that
forces the presiding or sole arbitrator to be a national of a third country
should be considered.
B.

Post-Award Problems Can Only Be Solved Through Comprehensive
Legal Reform

After the award, the problems within the Chinese judiciary emerge.
The post-judgment problems are far more difficult to measure or solve, as
they are relevant to the Chinese judiciary as a whole. Problems with judicial
competency, local protectionism, corruption, and a host of other problems
are well documented.176
The government is committed, at the very least, to insulating the
arbitration process from these problems. Limiting the jurisdiction of
arbitration awards to a few IPCs with dedicated courts to hear the cases
allows for more competent, experienced judges to hear cases.177 Many of
these judges speak English and have gone through training offered by the
central government.178
The Civil Procedure Law contains multiple
provisions allowing coercive measures to be employed to reduce obstacles to
enforcement.179 The direct approval by the SPC for non-enforcement of
judgments also greatly reduces the risk of local protectionism.180
In spite of these changes, the courts are still unable to consistently
seize assets in order to fulfill arbitral awards. This is not for lack of welldrafted statutes, but rather the lack of political power and will. The Chinese
judiciary must use the law available to it to enforce the arbitral awards. This
will only be achieved when the judiciary is able to operate independent of
the rest of the government. Therefore, the government must endeavor to
free the judiciary from the controls of other organs of government and
encourage it to use its legal power authorized by the National People’s
Congress.
In addition to long-term development of the judiciary, the government
should allow immediate transparency in the system. Researchers currently
176
177
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179
180
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face enormous difficulties in doing empirical research in China; courts are
unwilling to cooperate because they are afraid of the repercussions of
providing information to foreign researchers.181 A broad study of arbitration
and enforcement in China would likely increase the trust in the arbitration
process, and it would allow for better identification of areas in need of
improvement. While the study should ultimately be conducted by an
objective third-party, governmental cooperation is necessary. Arbitration is
expressly limited to commercial activities, so the government has little
reason to fear such changes in arbitration.182 In fact, a strong, transparent
arbitration system, like a strong judiciary, can have only positive effects on
the economy of China.
The actual execution of awards will likely continue to be difficult in
China, as better enforcement is contingent upon the reformation of a wide
swath of Chinese statutes and regulations.183 Essentially, greater success
rates in the seizure of assets are dependent upon greater transparency and
access to financial records of corporations by the courts. Because this
touches on such disparate topics as corporate formation, bankruptcy, and
debt, the Chinese government can only improve the rates of successful
recovery of arbitral awards through comprehensive reform.
Though such a task is daunting, there is some cause for optimism.
Lawmakers in China are promulgating new laws that better protect creditors
by forcing more disclosure. The new Company Law, which became
effective January 2006, now requires the disclosure of the company’s legal
representative, its address, and the names of all shareholders.184 These new
provisions have the potential to solve many of the problems of finding
assets. However, the courts must also have the resolve to use this
information to enforce arbitral awards.
VII. CONCLUSION
Arbitration in China has developed at a fast pace over the past thirty
years, and CIETAC should be commended for its progress. In that brief time
period, it has developed into the world’s leading arbitration center, become a
dependable dispute resolution forum, and assisted in the buildup of China’s
flourishing market.185 However, because CIETAC is still plagued by the
181
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traditional misperceptions linked to the Chinese justice system, the
government must find ways to eliminate these perceptions. The principal
way for this to happen is to maximize transparency; cooperation with
professionals and academics would allow for greater trust in the system.
The present condition of arbitration law in China, perhaps like much
of Chinese law, is not as dire as some analysts would believe. There are
operating institutions with objective standards. The legal regime governing
arbitration, while far from perfect, offers protection from egregious
deviations from justice. However, China must continue to pursue a legal
environment that encourages the judiciary to act independently of the other
bodies of government. Through this, not only will arbitration in China
improve, but it will also further the overall goal of rule of law in China.

